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Abstract 
In English, the Moving Ego metaphor conceptualizes the ego as moving forward through time 
and the Moving Time metaphor construes time as moving forward toward the ego. Recent 
research has provided evidence that people’s metaphorical perspectives on deictic time may 
be influenced by experiences—both spatial and non-spatial—that are connected to approach 
motivations (Moving Ego) and avoidance motivations (Moving Time). We extend this research 
further, asking whether there are differences in preferred temporal perspective between those 
who exhibit higher and lower degrees of power, as high power has been connected to 
approach motivations and low power, to avoidance motivations. Across two temporal tasks, 
participants in our study who adopted high-power poses demonstrated a greater preference 
for the Moving Ego perspective, compared to those adopting low-power poses. These results 
suggest an embodied connection between approach and avoidance motivations and the 
Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Across languages, spatial terms are used to talk about time. The reason for this, conceptual 
metaphor theorists propose, is that our embodied experiences in the physical world provide a 
natural and logical foundation for the comprehension of more abstract domains (Gibbs, 1994; 
Kövecses, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). In the domain of time, for instance, 
metaphors exhibit an experiential basis that is grounded in the experience of moving through 
and observing motion in space. 
 
Many ways of spatialising time are evident both within English and across languages: 
‘deictic’ metaphors situate events in relation to the ego (Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999), ‘sequential’ metaphors position events in relation to one another, as part of a sequence 
(Moore, 2006; Núñez, Motz & Teuscher, 2006), and ‘extrinsic’ metaphors fix events in 
relation to the forward-moving flow of time (Kranjec, 2006). Of these, particular attention 
has been paid to two deictic space-time metaphors: in the Moving Ego metaphor, time is 
construed as a stationary landscape, across which the active ego moves (e.g. We’re coming up 
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to the deadline; We’re approaching New Year’s Eve) and in the Moving Time metaphor, time 
is conceived as a series of events that move relative to a stationary ego (e.g. The deadline’s 
coming up; New Year’s Eve is approaching) (Clark, 1973). In research investigating the 
psychological reality of these two metaphors, Boroditsky and colleagues (2000; Boroditsky & 
Ramscar, 2002; see also Gentner, Imai & Boroditsky, 2002) conducted a series of 
experiments to examine whether engaging in thought about spatial motion might influence 
how people reason about time. For instance, by using an ambiguous temporal probe, namely 
Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day is the meeting now 
that it has been rescheduled? (cf. McGlone & Harding, 1998), Boroditsky and Ramscar 
(2002) found that participants who were instructed to imagine themselves moving through 
space towards a stationary object (analogous to the Moving Ego perspective) were more 
likely to re-use this perspective for time and answer Friday, whereas participants who were 
instructed to imagine a moving object travelling through space towards them (analogous to 
the Moving Time perspective) were more likely to respond Monday. In discussing the 
implications of their findings, Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) concluded that people’s 
thinking about time is closely linked to their spatial experiences, such that engaging in 
thought about motion in space can dramatically affect how people reason about time.  
 
Extending beyond testing the effects of spatial experiences on temporal reasoning, 
recent lines of research have provided initial evidence that personality differences, lifestyle, 
and emotional experiences may also influence how people think about the movement of 
events in time (Duffy & Feist, 2014; Duffy, Feist & McCarthy, 2014; Hauser, Carter & Meier, 
2009; Richmond, Wilson & Zinken, 2012). For example, Hauser et al. (2009) observed a 
connection between anger and temporal perspective, whereby participants who scored higher 
on measures of trait anger (Study 1) or read an anger-producing story (Study 2) were more 
likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective. Building on insights from these findings, 
Richmond et al. (2012) sought to investigate a connection between emotional state (e.g., 
happy, sad, anxious), personal agency, and temporal perspective. Their findings suggest that 
individuals experiencing positive emotions and high personal agency were more likely to 
adopt the Moving Ego perspective, while those experiencing negative emotions and low 
personal agency were more likely to adopt the Moving Time perspective. In another line of 
research, Duffy and Feist (2014) observed a connection between extroversion and temporal 
perspective, whereby participants adopting the Moving Ego perspective averaged higher 
extroversion scores than did participants adopting the Moving Time perspective. 
 
Uniting these findings is a shared grounding of the factors in approach and avoidance 
motivations. Anger, happiness, and extroversion all correlated with the Moving Ego 
perspective; these three factors are likewise grounded in approach motivations (Elliot & 
Thrash, 2002; Harmon-Jones, 2003; Richmond et al., 2012). Like the deictic Moving Ego 
metaphor, approach motivations, with their activation of goal-directed behaviours, make 
salient motion in the direction defined by the perceiver’s forward-facing stance (Elliot, 2008). 
In contrast, anxiety and depression, which correlated with the Moving Time perspective 
(Richmond et al., 2012), are grounded in avoidance motivations (Margolies & Crawford, 
2008; Richmond et al., 2012). Avoidance motivations, with their activation of inhibited 
behaviours, make salient both stasis and backward motion (Elliot, 2008) and, hence, the 
motion implicated is in the direction consistent with the Moving Time metaphor. 
Underscoring these connections, other lines of research in this area have demonstrated that 
the valence of the event (positive or negative) may also contribute to people’s perspectives on 
the movement of events in time. In line with the assumption that positive affect tends to be 
spatially represented by approach motivations and negative affect, by avoidance motivations 
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(e.g. Chen & Bargh, 1999; Elliot, 2008; Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson & 
Strack, 2008),
1
 Margolies and Crawford (2008) found that people were more likely to 
describe themselves as approaching a positively valenced event and more likely to describe a 
negatively valenced event as approaching them. 
 
Combined with earlier research on spatial motivations for metaphors, the reviewed research 
thus provides an important foundation for the understanding of the deictic metaphoric 
representation of time, illustrating that people’s conceptualisations of time may be shaped, in 
part, by a complex of experiences—both spatial and non-spatial—that are grounded in the 
experience of moving forward (Moving Ego) and the experience of moving backward 
(Moving Time), with these experiences providing an embodied cognitive link to a host of 
personality dimensions via approach and avoidance motivations. Because approach and 
avoidance are grounded in physical experience, the connection would be strengthened by 
evidence drawing upon a physically manifested motivational factor that is likewise connected 
to approach and avoidance motivations. One such factor is power in interpersonal relations. 
Elevated power has been associated with increased rewards and positive affect, which 
activates approach-related tendencies, while reduced power has been coupled with inhibited 
social behaviour, increased threat and negative affect, which triggers inhibition-related 
tendencies (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003). Like approach motivation, high power is 
associated with directed behaviour towards particular goals (Cuddy, Wilmuth, Yap & Carney, 
2015), aligning well with the Moving Ego perspective. By contrast, avoidance motivation, 
which facilitates passive or inhibited behaviours (Higgins, 1997), concords with the Moving 
Time perspective. 
 
Humans and other animals display high levels of power spatially through expansive 
and open postures, such as widespread limbs and the enlargement of occupied space by 
spreading out, whereas low levels of power are displayed through contractive and closed 
postures, such as limbs touching the torso and the minimization of occupied space by caving 
the body inward (Carney, Hall & Smith LeBeau, 2005; Darwin, 1872; de Waal, 1998). Recent 
research has shown that enacting high-power and low-power poses may not only reflect 
feelings of power, but also produce them (Carney et al. 2005; Carney, Cuddy & Yap, 2010; 
Cuddy et al. 2015). Specifically, in one study, Carney et al. (2010) found that when 
participants engaged in a simple two-minute power-pose manipulation, it was sufficient to 
alter their physiological and mental states: participants adopting high-power poses 
experienced elevated levels of the dominance hormone testosterone, decreased levels of the 
stress hormone cortisol, increased feelings of power, and higher tolerance for risk, while 
those adopting low-power poses exhibited the opposite pattern. Carney et al. (2010) 
concluded that the effects of embodiment extend beyond simply thinking and feeling, to 
physiology and concomitant behavioural choices (but see Ranehill, Dreber, Johannesson, 
Leiberg, Sul & Weber [2015] for a contrasting view). In the current study, we ask whether the 
effects on mental states might extend to reasoning as motivated by the embodied cognitive 
link connecting power to metaphoric representations via the shared intersections with 
approach and avoidance motivation. 
 
To this end, the current study examines directly whether the two-minute adoption of a 
particular power pose (high-power or low-power) (cf. Carney et al., 2010) may influence how 
people think about time and their preferred temporal perspective (Moving Ego or Moving 
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Time). Participants adopted either high-power or low-power poses immediately before 
answering a series of questions designed to assess their preferred temporal perspective. If 
there is a connection between approach and avoidance motivations and the Moving Ego and 
Moving Time perspectives, respectively, we expect that participants adopting high-power 
poses will be more likely to envisage themselves moving through time, demonstrating a 
preference for the Moving Ego perspective, whereas those adopting low-power poses will be 
more likely to imagine time moving towards them, demonstrating a preference for the 
Moving Time perspective. 
 
2. Method 
 
80 undergraduates (55 females and 25 males), all native speakers of English, participated in 
the study in exchange for a small reward. The study took place on a Wednesday. Participants 
were randomly assigned to adopt one of two power poses (as used in Cuddy et al., 2015, and 
Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy & Carney, 2013): a high-power pose (i.e. expansive; open; N 
= 40, 28 female) or a low-power pose (i.e. contractive; closed; N = 40, 27 female). In past 
research, holding these poses for as little as two minutes resulted in high-power posers 
feeling more “powerful” and “in charge” than did low-power posers (Carney et al., 2010). In 
the current study, participants maintained their poses for two minutes while undertaking a 
filler task that consisted of viewing a series of gestalts projected onto a screen (cf. Carney et 
al., 2010). Participants were told that their task was to remember the gestalts, with a memory 
test to be administered after a filler task about time. 
 
Next, participants completed two tasks that were included for measuring preferred 
temporal perspective (Moving Ego or Moving Time). Firstly, participants provided a 
response to the ambiguous temporal question: Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved 
forward two days. What day has the meeting been rescheduled to? (cf. McGlone & Harding, 
1998). Secondly, participants completed an acceptability judgment task which consisted of 
evaluating 9 pairs of temporal expressions, such as We’re approaching Christmas (Moving 
Ego) and Christmas is approaching (Moving Time) (cf. Duffy & Feist, 2014). Participants 
were presented with a 5-point Likert scale for each pair of expressions, with each expression 
anchoring one end of the scale and “equally preferable” anchoring the centre.2  
 
3. Results 
 
As evidenced by responses on both measures, participants in the high-power pose 
condition were more likely to envisage themselves moving through time, adopting the 
Moving Ego perspective, than participants in the low-power pose condition. Concretely, for 
the Wednesday’s meeting question, 80% of participants responded Friday in the high-power 
pose condition, in comparison to 53% of participants in the low-power pose condition (χ21,80 = 
6.765, p = .009, Cramer’s V = .291). In order to better understand the effect of the power pose 
manipulation, we performed a chi-square goodness of fit to test whether the proportions of 
Monday and Friday responses differed reliably from chance (i.e. 50% of each). The results 
showed that the proportions of Monday and Friday responses differed from chance among 
high-power posers (χ2 (1) = 13.22; p = .0003), but not among low-power posers (χ2 (1) = .02; 
p = .888).  
 
                                            
2
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the absence of spatial priming (Duffy & Feist, 2014). 
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A similar asymmetry in temporal perspective is evident in participants’ preferences 
for either the syntactic framing associated with the Moving Ego perspective or that associated 
with the Moving Time perspective in the absence of ambiguity. To examine these 
preferences, we assigned numerical values to the Likert scales used in the acceptability 
judgment task, with -2 corresponding to the Moving Time end of the scale, 0 corresponding 
to the centre of the scale (i.e. both statements equally preferable), and +2 corresponding to the 
Moving Ego end of the scale (cf. Duffy & Feist, 2014). Mean scores for each participant were 
then calculated by adding the scores for each statement and dividing by the total number of 
statements, i.e. 9. Thus, a mean score below 0 indicates a preference for the Moving Time 
perspective, whereas a mean score above 0 indicates a preference for the Moving Ego 
perspective. As predicted, in comparison to participants in the low-power pose condition (M 
= -.366; SD = .797), participants in the high-power pose condition demonstrated a preference 
for the syntactic framing associated with the Moving Ego perspective (M = .519; SD = .823), 
judging sentences such as We’re approaching Christmas as more preferable than Christmas 
is approaching (t(78) = 4.883, p < .001, d = 1.092). 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The ubiquity of spatial language in metaphoric expressions for time has generated substantial 
attention in recent years, with findings suggesting that spatial experiences influence people’s 
interpretations of temporal metaphor (e.g. Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; 
Gentner et al., 2002; Kranjec, 2006; Núñez et al., 2006). In order to understand spatial 
influences on temporal understanding, however, it has become increasingly clear that we 
must look beyond concrete spatial situations to take into account the influences of spatially-
grounded aspects of speakers’ situations and personalities. To wit, recent research has 
suggested that approach-motivated traits such as anger and personal agency may be 
connected to speakers’ preference for either the Moving Ego or the Moving Time perspective. 
In this study, we expand along these lines to consider effects of personal feelings of power. 
 
Like other approach-motivated traits, feelings of power have been argued to trigger 
disinhibited behaviour and a sense of control over the environment, while powerlessness 
triggers “those features of the self relevant to others’ goals” (Keltner et al., 2003, p. 265), 
aligning well with the Moving Ego and Moving Time perspectives, respectively. However, 
unlike other approach-motivated traits, feelings of power may be experimentally induced in 
the lab (Carney et al., 2010), allowing an examination of the connection between power and 
temporal perspective independent of other personality factors inherent to the participants. In 
addition, feelings of power can arise from physical experiences (Carney et al., 2010), 
allowing us to expand our investigation to include embodied reflexes of motivating factors. 
Our findings suggest a connection between induced feelings of power and temporal 
perspective, with participants who maintained a high-power pose evidencing a greater 
preference for the Moving Ego perspective than that shown by their low-power pose peers.  
 
While there was a reliable difference in response between the groups on both 
measures of temporal perspective, the effects of the manipulation seem to be stronger among 
participants in the high-power pose condition, particularly for the Wednesday’s meeting 
question. Thus, Friday responses were more prominent than Monday responses among high-
power posers, while low-power posers evidenced no preference for either perspective. 
Turning to the syntactic preference task, while we observed a preference for constructions 
consistent with the Moving Ego perspective among high-power posers and for constructions 
consistent with the Moving Time perspective among low-power posers, high-power posers’ 
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average ratings differed from “equally preferable” (i.e. 0) to a greater extent in comparison to 
those of low-power posers (0.519 and -0.366, respectively).  
 
A closer consideration of the details of approach and avoidance motivations suggests 
two possible reasons for this asymmetry. The first is rooted in the directional differences 
between approach and avoidance motivations and the effects they may have on temporal 
reasoning. To wit, approach motivation tends to be construed in terms of forward movement 
and avoidance motivation, in terms of backward movement (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Elliot, 2006). In a series of studies investigating the effects of thinking about abstract motion 
on temporal reasoning, Matlock, Holmes, Srinivasan and Ramscar (2011) asked whether 
engaging in thought about forward and backward movement would influence people’s 
preferred temporal perspectives. They found that when participants were primed with 
sequences that involved forward abstract motion (e.g. 5 to 17 or G to P), they were more 
likely to adopt the Moving Ego perspective and respond Friday to the Wednesday’s meeting 
question, whereas when participants were primed with sequences that involved backward 
abstract motion (e.g. 17 to 5 or P to G), there was no reliable difference between the 
proportion of Friday and Monday responses. Matlock and colleagues argued that this pattern 
arises from an asymmetry between forward and backward movement, as forward motion is 
deeply entrenched in everyday locomotion, whereas people are far less familiar with 
backward motion. In the current study, we observed a stronger effect amongst participants in 
whom we induced elevated feelings of power, which activate approach-related motivations 
(ergo, forward motion), than among those in whom we induced reduced feelings of power, 
which involves avoidance-related motions (ergo, backward motion).  
 
The second reason is rooted in an asymmetry in the strength of the connections 
between approach and avoidance motivations and forward and backward motion, 
respectively. Whereas approach motivations are always associated with active, forward 
motion, avoidance motivations are connected to passive behaviours and absence of motion 
(cf. Richmond et al., 2012), in addition to backward motion. The consistency of association 
between approach motivations and forward motions may thus lead to a deeply entrenched 
connection, allowing activation of approach motivations (resulting from the increased 
feelings of power induced in high-power posers) to likewise increase preference for the 
similarly motivated Moving Ego perspective. In contrast, the association between avoidance 
motivations and motion is far less consistent, limiting the possibility for avoidance 
motivations to affect motion-grounded temporal perspectives. 
 
These asymmetries in spatial motivation provide a window into the complexity of the 
source domain, suggesting that the simple contrast between different conceptualizations of 
which entity is in motion (i.e. Ego or Time, and their associated directional possibilities) may 
be but part of the story of spatial influences on temporal thinking. Moving beyond the 
approach-motivated traits reviewed above, Duffy and her colleagues (Duffy & Feist, 2014; 
Duffy et al., 2014) have recently observed influences of personality traits connected to deixis, 
both when measured in the lab and when inferred based upon real-world behaviours. For 
example, reasoning that procrastination involves the habitual movement of events into the 
future, akin to the Moving Ego perspective, Duffy and her colleagues examined responses to 
the Wednesday’s meeting question among participants who had either responded to 
questionnaires regarding procrastination and conscientiousness (Duffy & Feist, 2014) or been 
stopped while going about their everyday activities in which they were either running late, on 
time, or running early (Duffy et al., 2014). In both cases, participants who adopted the 
Moving Ego perspective (responding Friday) evidenced higher rates of procrastination than 
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participants who adopted the Moving Time perspective. However, in addition to movement 
towards the future, procrastination represents the movement of events away from a speaker’s 
position in time, while conscientiousness involves the movement of events towards their 
current position in time; hence, these traits may be connected to deictic motion. Additional 
evidence regarding the role of deixis comes from another study, in which Feist and Duffy 
(2015) varied the verb in the Wednesday’s meeting question: participants asked about the date 
after the meeting was “brought forward” (suggesting motion toward the observer) adopted the 
Moving Time perspective (responding Monday) more frequently than participants asked 
about the date after the meeting was “taken forward” (suggesting motion away from the 
observer). 
 
Connecting these two lines of research, we observe that the expansive poses 
associated with high power involve movement of the limbs away from the body, while 
inhibition and low power involve the movement of limbs inward toward the body. Thus, in 
addition to being grounded in approach and avoidance motivations, power may draw upon an 
embodied cognitive link with spatial deixis, much like the personality traits studied by Duffy 
and her colleagues. Thus, direction of motion relative to an observer’s position may provide 
an additional spatial motivation for the two temporal perspectives, complementing the 
directionality associated with the different metaphorical movers. By uniting and expanding 
upon recent experimental findings, the current study more clearly draws out connections 
between the abstract domain of time and the embodied spatial reality of human experience: 
our embodied understanding of motion in space and the ways in which we carry it over to 
other domains may be more intricate than meets the eye.  
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